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The limits of EU hedge fund regulation
DAN AWREY
Oxford University
This article examines the mechanics of the recently adopted EU Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive. On
balance, the results of this examination are not encouraging. The EU has failed to mount a persuasive case for why
the Directive represents an improvement over existing national regulatory regimes or prevailing market practices in
several key areas. Furthermore, by attempting to shoehorn an economically, strategically and operationally diverse
population of financial institutions into a single, artificial class of regulated actors, the EU has established what is
in many respects a conceptually muddled regulatory regime. Most importantly, however, the Directive's approach
toward the amelioration of the potential systemic risks associated with alternative investment funds manifests an
inherent and ultimately fatal structural flaw. This flaw punctuates the necessity of a globally co-ordinated response
toward macro-prudential risks arising within a globally integrated financial system.
A. Introduction
On the surface, the global financial crisis of 2007-9 (the
"GFC") has served to galvanise support for the proposition
that we need to fundamentally rethink the ways in which we
regulate financial markets and institutions. This consensus is
reflected in the Communiqu6 released by G20 finance min-
isters and central bank governors following their summit in
Seoul, South Korea on 11-12 November 2010.1 Prominent
within this professed consensus is the conviction that we must
strengthen public regulation and oversight of the so-called
"shadow banking system": non-bank financial institutions
including structured investment vehicles, money market
funds and hedge funds. 2 Dig a little deeper, however, and it
is possible to detect emerging fault-lines between the Anglo-
Saxon and Continental perspectives. Perhaps nowhere is this
divergence of views more evident (or acute) than in connec-
tion with post-crisis regulatory reforms targeting hedge funds
and other "alternative" investment vehicles.
This article examines the mechanics of the recently
adopted Alternative Investment Fund Managers (AIFM)
Directive3 and offers some preliminary observations about its
likely effectiveness. On balance, the results of this examina-
tion are not encouraging. First, the EU has failed to mount a
persuasive case for why the Directive represents an improve-
ment over existing national regulatory regimes or prevailing
market practices in several key areas. Second, by attempting
to ring-fence a disparate and essentially artificial class of
financial institutions - as opposed to focusing on the various
economic functions performed by these institutions, their opera-
tional models and the attendant risks - the Directive establishes
what is in many respects a conceptually muddled regulatory
regime. Untangling this morass is likely to preoccupy regula-
tors and market participants well into the foreseeable future.
Finally, and most importantly, the Directive's approach toward
the amelioration of the potential systemic risks associated
with alternative investment funds manifests an inherent and
ultimately fatal structural flaw. It is this flaw which punctuates
the necessity of translating the consensus embodied in the
G20 Communiqu& into a globally co-ordinated regulatory
response.
B. Hedge fund regulation: a reality check
It can be difficult to cut through the rhetoric and dema-
goguery which surrounds the debate over the regulation
of hedge funds, private equity funds and other alternative
investment vehicles. Many observers view these institu-
tions as mechanisms of market efficiency: providing greater
diversification and liquidity, lowering market volatility and
enhancing the process of price discovery.4 Others, however,
view them as conduits for fraud and market manipulation
and as sources of potential systemic risks.5 Some commenta-
tors herald them as would-be champions of more effective
corporate governance. 6 Some, meanwhile, condemn them as
inherently short-termist7 or, somewhat more colourfully, as
"hoodlums"8 and "locusts". 9 There is a broad perception that
hedge funds were unregulated prior to the GFC.Yet, within
the EU at least, this was demonstrably not the case. t0 There is
also a widely held view that hedge funds are highly - if not
excessively - leveraged. Again, empirical evidence perhaps
suggests otherwise.11
So what do we know about hedge funds and other alterna-
tive investments? First, the universe of alternative investment
funds encompasses a hugely diverse range of financial institu-
tions engaged in a variety of different activities and posing
very different prospective risks. Accordingly, there is likely
to be no one-size-fits-all approach toward their regulation.
Second, the risks posed by alternative investment funds are
by no means unique to them. Proprietary trading desks,
sovereign wealth funds, insurance companies and other
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institutional investors are frequently capable of playing
similar roles within financial markets - and thus generating
similar risks. Third, investors, counterparties and regulators
require information respecting these funds and their man-
agers in order to properly monitor these risks. 12 Insofar as
private market mechanisms prove ineffective in this regard,
there exists a potential role for public regulation in terms of
subsidising disclosure of this information and, more broadly,
ensuring that these institutions implement appropriate poli-
cies and procedures respecting, inter alia, business conduct,
governance and risk management.At the same time, however,
more stringent regulation is not a panacea: Bear Stearns,
Lehman Brothers and AIG were all heavily regulated. Finally,
alternative investment funds were not a proximate cause of
the GFC," nor have the substantial number of fund failures
which have followed in its wake triggered systemic instability.
That said, it would be foolish to disregard the possibility that
these institutions - and hedge funds in particular - might
be the catalysts of future systemic crises.14 It is within this
complex and politically charged environment that the EU has
introduced the AIFM Directive.
C. The AIFM Directive: the basic mechanics
The AIFM Directive introduces harmonised requirements
for financial intermediaries engaged in the management and
administration of alternative investment funds (AIFs) within
the EU. The Directive (Article 3(a)) defines an AIF as any
collective investment scheme which does not require author-
isation under the Undertakings for Collective Investments in
Transferable Securities (UCITS) Directive.15 This broad defi-
nition was designed to capture hedge funds, private equity
funds, real estate funds and other institutional investment
vehicles which had previously fallen outside the perimeter of
EU financial regulation.16 Management and administration
of AlFs are, subject to certain limited exceptions, reserved to
EU-domiciled AIFMs authorised under the Directive.t 7
The Directive mandates that any AIFM seeking to manage
or market an AIF within the EU obtain authorisation from
the competent authorities in its home Member State.18
The Directive contains a de minirnus exemption for manag-
ers which directly or indirectly manage AIF portfolios with
total assets of less than E100m. 19 This threshold is raised to
E500m for managers which (i) only manage AilFs which
do not employ any leverage, and (ii) do not grant investors
redemption rights for at least five years from the date of a
fund's inception.20 As a precondition to authorisation, an
AIFM will be required to provide the competent authorities
with detailed information respecting, inter alia, the identity
of its owners, the characteristics of the AIFs it intends to
manage, and any arrangements for the delegation of manage-
ment functions and the valuation and safekeeping of portfolio
assets. 21 More broadly an AIFM will be required to satisfy the
competent authorities that it will be able to comply with the
substantive requirements of the Directive.22 Once authorised,
an AIFM will be permitted to provide management services
to AIFs domiciled in any Member State23 and to market the
securities of the ALFs it manages to "professional investors" 24
across the EU.2 5 In the short term, this passport will only be
available to EU-domiciled AIFs and AIFMs. It is presently
contemplated, however, that the passport will be extended to
non-EU-domiciled managers and funds in 2013.26
An AIFM authorised under the Directive must ensure
compliance with substantive requirements respecting, inter
alia, (1) conduct of business, governance and risk manage-
ment, (2) third-party valuation and safekeeping, and (3) initial,
periodic and event-driven disclosure to investors, the com-
petent authorities and certain third-party stakeholders. The
Directive also empowers the European Commission27 and, in
exceptional circumstances, the competent authorities within
each Member State, to restrict the use of leverage by AIFs.
1. Conduct of business, governance and risk
management requirements
The Directive imposes uniform duties of care and loyalty on
authorised AIFMs. Specifically, it mandates that an AIFM (i)
act honestly, with due skill, care and diligence and fairly in
conducting its activities, (ii) act in the best interests of the
AIFs it manages, the investors in those AlFs and the integrity
of the market, and (iii) ensure that all AIF investors are treated
fairly.28 An AIFM must also take all reasonable steps to iden-
tify conflicts of interest 29 and, thereafter, maintain and operate
effective organisational and administrative arrangements with
a view to preventing these conflicts from adversely affect-
ing the interests of an AIF or its investors. 30 Where an AIFM
identifies a material conflict of interest within its operations
- or where it determines that its conflict arrangements are
not sufficient to ensure with reasonable confidence that the
interests of AIF investors will not be adversely affected - it
must disclose this fact to AIF investors.31
The Directive mandates that an AIFM implement risk
management systems designed to measure and monitor all
risks to which the AIFs it manages may be exposed by virtue
of their investment strategies. 32 This requirement contem-
plates, inter alia, (i) the implementation of an appropriate,
documented and regularly updated due-diligence process for
making investments, (ii) ensuring that risks can be accurately
identified, measured and monitored through appropriate
stress-testing procedures, (iii) ensuring that the risk profile of
each AIF corresponds to its size, structure, investment strate-
gies and objectives,33 and (iv) where an AIF engages in short
selling, the implementation of procedures to manage the
related risks. 34 The Directive also requires an AIFM to imple-
ment systems designed to manage liquidity risk (ie ensure
adequate liquidity matching) and to conduct regular stress
tests of these systems under both normal and exceptional
market conditions.35 It further requires the separation of
portfolio and risk management functions -along with their
respective review processes -within the operational environ-
ment of an AIFM.36 These risk management requirements
are augmented by a requirement that an AIFM implement
remuneration policies that are consistent with and promote
sound risk management.37
Lastly, the Directive imposes modest initial and ongoing
capital requirements.All AIFMs are required to maintain own
funds of at least £125,000.38 In addition, where the aggregate
portfolio value of the AlFs it manages exceeds £250m, an
AIFM must set aside supplemental capital equal to 0.02 per
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cent of the amount by which the portfolio value exceeds
the 6250m threshold. Accordingly, for an AIF with a port-
folio value of £lbn, an AIFM would be required to put aside
capital totalling C275,000 (or 0.0275 per cent of aggregate
portfolio value). These capital requirements are subject to any
higher obligations imposed under Article 21 of the Capital
Requirements Directive39 governing the capital adequacy of
investment firms and credit institutions.
Perhaps not surprisingly given the broad nature of many
of these requirements - to say nothing of the wide diver-
sity of investment strategies, business models, conflicts of
interest and other risks typically encountered in connection
with different types ofAIF - the Directive contemplates that
the Commission will adopt level 2 implementing measures
further specifying the precise substance of these requirements
as they are intended to apply to each species ofAIF 40 Accord-
ingly, it is in many respects too early to evaluate the precise
impact of these requirements in terms of the day-to-day
conduct and practices ofAIFMs.
2. Third-party valuation and safekeeping
requirements
The Directive requires that an AIFM appoint an independent
third party to value both the portfolio assets of the AIFs it
manages and their issued securities.41 This valuation exercise
must be undertaken at least once a year and on each occasion
on which securities of an AIF are issued or redeemed. 42 An
AIFM must also appoint a depositary for the purposes of,
inter alia, (i) receiving subscription proceeds from AIF inves-
tors and depositing them into a segregated account, and (ii)
safekeeping AIF portfolio assets.43 The depositary must be a
credit institution having its registered office in the EU.44 The
depositary is required to act independently and solely in the
interests of AIF investors and will be liable to the AIFM and
AIF investors for any losses suffered by them as a result of its
failure to perform its obligations pursuant to the Directive. 45
3. Disclosure requirements
The Directive lays down a series of initial, periodic and
event-driven disclosure requirements designed to enhance
the transparency ofAIF activities to investors, the competent
authorities and certain other stakeholder constituencies. An
AIFM will be required to provide potential investors with,
inter alia, a description of the relevantAIF's (i) investment strat-
egy and objectives,46 (ii) valuation and redemption policies,
(iii) valuation, custody, administration and risk management
procedures, and (iv) fees, charges and expenses. 47 Thereafter,
an AIFM will be required to make available to investors on
an annual basis an audited report containing the AIF's balance
sheet, income statement, activity report and auditor's report.48
An AIFM must also submit these annual reports to the com-
petent authorities in its home Member State.49
The Directive contemplates additional periodic disclosure
to both investors and the competent authorities respecting
(i) the percentage ofAIF portfolio assets which are subject to
special arrangements arising from their illiquid nature, (ii) any
new arrangements for managing liquidity and (iii) the current
risk profile of each AIF and the systems employed by the
AIFM to manage these risks. 50 An AIFM will also be required
to provide aggregated information to the competent authori-
ties on a regular basis respecting the principal markets and
instruments in which its AIFs trade, their principal exposures
and important concentrations of risk.51 In addition, an AIFM
must report to the competent authorities the main categories
of assets in which its AIFs are invested and, where relevant,
the use of short selling.52 The Directive contemplates that
the Commission will adopt implementing measures which
ensure that the nature and frequency of these periodic disclo-
sures - or at least those targeted at investors - will be tailored
to each species ofAIE53
Finally, the Directive imposes event-driven and sub-
sequent periodic disclosure obligations on an AIFM in
connection with the acquisition of a controlling interest in
a company domiciled in the EU which employs more than
250 persons, has an annual turnover exceeding E50m and a
balance sheet exceeding E43m. 54 An AIFM will be deemed
to have acquired a "controlling interest" if either it or any of
the AIFs it manages holds, either individually or in the aggre-
gate, 30 per cent or more of the voting rights of the target
company.55 Where an AIFM acquires a controlling interest,
it must make available to the company, its shareholders and
employees (or their representatives) certain prescribed infor-
mation.56 In addition, an AIFM must include in its annual
report information pertaining to each company in which it
holds a controlling interest. More specifically, the report must
include information respecting, inter alia: (i) its operational
and financial affairs, (ii) any financial risks associated with
its capital structure, (iii) employee turnover, termination and
recruitment and (iv) any significant divestment of assets. 57
4. Leverage requirements
Last, but by no means least, the Directive empowers the Com-
mission to set leverage requirements for AIFs where it deems
them necessary to ensure the stability and integrity of the
financial system.58 It further empowers national authorities
to restrict the use of leverage in respect of individual AIFMs
and AIFs in exceptional circumstances. 59 The Directive man-
dates that an AIFM evaluate on a quarterly basis whether any
of the AIFs it manages employ high levels of leverage on a
systematic basis. 60 An AIF will be deemed to have met this
test where its combined leverage from all sources exceeds the
value of its equity capital in two out of the past four quar-
ters.6 1 Where an AIF exceeds this threshold, its manager must
make prescribed disclosures to both AIF investors 62 and the
competent authorities in its home Member State.63
D. The AIFM Directive: some preliminary
observations
There exists a theoretically strong informational argument in
support of bringing many alternative investment funds and
their managers within the perieter of financial regulation.
This argument is the strongest for hedge funds which, by and
large, raise the most acute potential investor protection and
market integrity problems and pose the greatest potential
systemic risks.64 At the same time, there is obvious informa-
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tional utility in casting a somewhat broader net in recognition
of the fact that institutions - and their attendant risks - can
be expected to evolve over time. Direct public oversight of
these institutions through authorisation and suitably tailored
regulatory reporting requirements would provide competent
authorities with information necessary to engage in more
effective monitoring, and, ultimately, develop a better under-
standing of, among other matters, their evolving micro- and
macro-prudential risk profiles.65 Enhanced disclosure to
investors, meanwhile, would promote more informed con-
tracting and, potentially, bring an end to questionable industry
practices such as the provision of investor "side letters". 66
What is ultimately unclear, however, is the extent to which
the informational requirements embedded within the AIFM
Directive will represent a marked improvement over existing
national regulatory regimes or prevailing market practices.The
issue here is not whether the Directive violates the principle
of subsidiarity per se, but rather whether it is likely to have
any real world impact. By way of illustration, the UK is home
to the vast majority of EU-domiciled hedge fund managers.
In total, the FSA oversees roughly 85 per cent of managers67
exercising discretion over approximately 80 per cent of Euro-
pean hedge fund assets. 68 The FSA has long collected data
from these managers in the context of its day-to-day supervi-
sory activities and through thematic reviews, targeted surveys
and non-supervisory dialogue.69 Simultaneously and
perhaps not surprisingly given the influence of sophisticated
institutional investors on the demand side - the marketplace
has exhibited some sensitivity to investor protection concerns
as evidenced by, among other things, the voluntary provision
of comprehensive pre-sale disclosure. The Alternative Invest-
ment Fund Management Association (AIFMA), for example,
has developed a due-diligence questionnaire for prospective
hedge fund investors which has purportedly become widely
used within the industry.70 Ultimately, the effectiveness of
these (and other) existing mechanisms for subsidising the
production of potentially salient information undermines the
practical case for pan-European regulatory intervention.
The EU has similarly failed to make a persuasive case
for why the Directive will enhance conduct of business or
risk-management practices. Once again, the FSA and other
national regulators already impose conduct of business and
risk-management requirements on authorised advisers and
managers. Many of these institutions are also subject to the
Capital Requirements Directive. EU regulatory interven-
tion is rendered even less of an imperative by the fact that
regulators in many of these jurisdictions -including the
German Federal Ministry of Finance,71 a strong supporter
of the AIFM Directive- have acknowledged the robustness
of hedge fund risk management practices relative to those
of other market participants. 72 Indeed, that the hedge fund
industry has developed relatively robust practices in this area
should not come as a surprise: the high-powered incen-
tives generated by the combination of a carried interest,73
managerial co-investment 74 and the reputational market for
investment management services make it in the economic
interests of managers to design and implement effective safe-
guards against excessive risk-taking in the vast majority of
circumstances.75
Proponents counter with the assertion that the AIFM
Directive will ensure a harmonised approach toward disclo-
sure, conduct of business and risk-management requirements.
There are three relatively straightforward rejoinders to
this argument. First, it is far from certain that harmonisa-
tion represents the optimal approach toward the regulation
of financial markets or institutions. The primary source
of uncertainty in this regard stems from the prospective, if
empirically contestable, benefits of regulatory competi-
tion.76 Second, the EU's own Impact Assessment77 -the
relevant portion of which, at three pages, might charitably
be described as perfunctory78 - reveals no striking diversity
of substantive approaches among Member States toward the
regulation of alternative investments (and hedge funds in
particular) but, rather, a broadly consistent one. 79 What is
more, as exemplified by the AIFMA due-diligence question-
naire, private mechanisms have already helped to promote a
form of defacto harmonisation - and all without the bother
or expense of direct regulatory intervention at the EU level.
Third, and most importantly, harmonisation at the EU level is
ultimately illusionary within the broader context of globally
integrated financial markets. As examined in greater detail
below, nowhere is this more readily apparent than in connec-
tion with the regulation of potential systemic risks.
A second overarching problem with the Directive stems
from the decision to shoehorn an economically, strategically
and operationally diverse population of financial institutions
into a single, artificial class of regulated actors. This deci-
sion has opened the door to some potentially cumbersome
(even nonsensical) rulemaking. The third-party valuation and
safekeeping requirements provide a representative example.
There exists a strong case in favour of imposing such require-
ments on institutions which (i) invest in relatively liquid assets
(ie marketable securities), (ii) invest in markets with limited
price transparency (ie over-the-counter derivatives markets)
and/or (iii) provide investors with liquidity in circumstances
not contingent on the prior realisation of portfolio assets.We
might expect the majority of hedge funds, for example, to
fall squarely into all three categories. In such circumstances,
third-party valuation requirements would eliminate the con-
flict of interest arising where a manager compensated on the
basis of assets under management exercises discretion over
the valuation of investments for which there is no current,
publicly available market price.80 Safekeeping requirements,
meanwhile, would serve to mitigate custody risk: ring-
fencing client assets in the event of insolvency and thwarting
Madoff-type frauds in which the opacity of an institution'
investment activities -combined with the ease, speed and
anonymity with which portfolio assets can be liquidated-
render it relatively straightforward for managers to make off
with client money.81
It is far more difficult, however, to understand the ration-
ale for imposing these requirements on, for example, private
equity funds.The long-term, illiquid and typically very public
nature of the investments made by these institutions virtually
eliminates the potential for Madoff-type fraud. Put differently,
the observability and verifiability of investment and divest-
ment (and thus potential defection) to both investors and the
marketplace provides an extremely powerful disincentive for
would-be fraudsters. This practical constraint obviates much
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of the regulatory justification for placing the underlying assets
- share certificates in private companies in this case - with
a depositary.82 It is similarly difficult to identify the justifi-
cation for third-party valuation requirements. As a starting
point, arm's length valuators will invariably find themselves
at a comparative disadvantage vis-a-vis private equity firms
in terms of the production and verification of salient infor-
mation respecting the value of portfolio investments. This
disadvantage is a function of both the general expertise pos-
sessed by private equity firms in evaluating the type of asset in
question and, more importantly, their substantial asset-specific
investments in due diligence and ongoing monitoring. More
importantly, however, the mechanics of private equity funds
eliminate the latent conflict of interest at the heart of the
valuation problem.83 Specifically, distributions to inves-
tors are typically triggered by the disposition of portfolio
investments (including via IPO).84 Investor liquidity is thus
contingent upon prior disposition, which provides a credible
(indeed, some might say definitive) third-party valuation of
the asset. This link between investor liquidity and disposition
also makes it difficult to understand how the liquidity risk
management and related disclosure requirements set out in
the Directive would apply to private equity funds (or, indeed,
most other alternative investments). It is equally difficult to
understand precisely what regulatory objectives the imposi-
tion of these requirements on such funds would ultimately
serve. The Directive is, unfortunately, awash in such ambigui-
ties.
The EU has conceded that many of the core provisions
of the Directive will need to be tailored to reflect different
species of alternative investment fund. Indeed, it has gone
so far as to acknowledge - without offering any specifics
- that some of these provisions may "make no sense" 85 for
certain types of funds. It is the EU's view, however, that these
more detailed, bespoke rules can and will be fleshed out in
the process of formulating level 2 implementing measures,
technical standards and guidelines. The EU anticipates this
process will take up to two years. 86 Here we find another
curious policy choice. Citing the need to "proceed quickly"
in response to the GFC, the EU dramatically curtailed its
normal consultation processes in connection with the for-
mulation of the Directive.87 Furthermore, at the time of this
abridged consultation, the scope of the EU's proposal was
expressly limited to hedge funds. Clearly, however, by electing
to defer the articulation of many substantive requirements to
the post-adoption rule-making phase, the EU has now effec-
tively negated the potential benefits, if any, derived from a
swift regulatory response. Simultaneously, by expediting the
consultation process (and then dramatically expanding the
scope of the Directive), EU regulators have failed to effect-
ively leverage the vast wealth of available technical expertise
- expertise that would have undoubtediy helped to resolve
many of the issues with which they must now grapple. In the
short term, wrestling with these technical issues will consume
precious time and other resources. In the long term, and more
broadly, the Directive's myopic focus on the object of regula-
tory intervention -rather than the objectives of it -seems an
unlikely strategy for generating effective regulation.
Nowhere is the nearsightedness of the AIFM Directive
more clearly reflected than in its approach toward the amel-
ioration of potential systemic risks.8 There are at least four
channels through which alternative investment funds could,
theoretically, undermine financial stability. The first and most
straightforward channel would be through the failure of a
fund (or group of funds) which was itself systemically impor-
tant. Second, the failure of a fund (or funds) could destabilise
a systemically important financial institution connected to
the fund(s) by virtue of its ownership, prime brokerage and/
or other counterparty relationships.89 Third, where a critical
mass of funds coalesced to exploit the same opportunities
within the same markets, simultaneous selling by these funds
could - given the right circumstances - undermine market
liquidity, exacerbate market volatility and, potentially, pre-
cipitate wider financial instability.90 Finally, the collapse of a
fund (or funds) could trigger a forced liquidation of portfolio
assets.9t Depending on the size of the liquidated positions
relative to the liquidity of the underlying market, a disorderly
"fire sale" could put significant downward pressure on prices
- imposing substantial losses on (systemically important)
counterparties and weakening the balance sheets of other
(systemically important) financial institutions via mark-to-
market accounting requirements. 92 However improbable, it is
thus not inconceivable that the adverse effects of fund failure
could reverberate throughout the global financial system.
The primary means by which the AIFM Directive
attempts to address these risks is through the imposition of
leverage constraints. Importantly, the EU is the only strate-
gically significant jurisdiction to restrict the use of leverage
by alternative investment funds. This includes the US - long
home to the largest and most influential segment of the global
alternative investment fund industry.93 Broadly speaking, the
rationale behind leverage constraints is that they reduce the
probability of fund failure - in effect by making funds less
sensitive to market fluctuations and, thus, less susceptible to
margin and/or collateral calls which might trigger a forced
liquidation of portfolio assets. 94 Implicit within this ration-
ale is also the belief that - owing both to competitive forces
within the prime brokerage industry and the status of finan-
cial stability as a public good - private counterparty credit
risk management is unlikely to represent an effective response
to potential systemic risks.
This logic is not necessarily incorrect - but it is incomplete.
The key insight here is derived from understanding that the
transmission of systemic risks through each of the channels
described above is in no way impeded by geopolitical bound-
aries. In a world of globally integrated financial markets and
institutions, the failure of a US hedge fund will have the same
systemic impact as the failure of an otherwise similarly situated
EU-domiciled fund. As a result, the EU cannot insulate itself
from the systemic repercussions arising from the failure of an
alternative investment fund operating outside the reach of the
AIFM Directive. The EU thus faces a bleak calculus: while
it will bear all of the direct and indirect costs of attempting
to address systemic risks, the benefits thereby generated will
be negligible insofar as it will remain exposed to negative
externalities stemming from the failure or refusal of other
jurisdictions to adopt equivalent measures.95 Simultaneously,
any benefits will, at least in part, spillover to these other juris-
dictions. Furthermore, relatively onerous leverage or other
requirements serve to provide EU-domiciled managers with
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a marginal incentive to (re)locate their businesses offshore.96
From the perspective of the EU (or any other jurisdiction for
that matter), systemic risk regulation thus represents a bundle
of potentially significant costs without the realistic prospect
of any corresponding benefits. It is for this reason that a glo-
bally coordinated response to potential systemic risks is not
only desirable, but an imperative.
E. Is the AIFM Directive a harbinger of things to
come?
The AIFM Directive was the product of a highly politicised
process pitting the UK (and its substantial domestic financial
services sector) against many of its Continental neighbours. 7
This process played out in the context of a broader power
shift within the EU away from national financial regulators
such as the FSA and toward three newly created pan-Euro-
pean institutions: the European Banking Authority, the
European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority
and the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA).
Brought into existence on 1 January 2011, it is ESMA which
will ultimately be responsible for the administration of the
Directive.
Understanding the Directive as the product of not only a
policy process - but also a political one - serves to shed con-
siderable light on many of its apparent shortcomings. For
example, viewed from this perspective, the Directive can be
understood not as a response to any perceived deficiency in
existing national regulatory regimes or market practices but,
alternatively, as an attempt to expand the scope of the EU's
authority within the field of financial regulation. Similarly,
the Directive's focus on the object of regulation, rather than
its objectives, can be viewed as reflecting a desire on the part
of some Member States - Germany and France key among
them - to identify a suitable scapegoat for the excesses of
Anglo-Saxon capitalism which they and many of their con-
stituents perceive as having, among other things, precipitated
the GFC.9 8 That these Member States had previously been
unable to compete with the UK in the financial services
sector made the economic calculus almost as straightforward
as the political one. Finally, the EU's relatively aggressive stance
in terms of the imposition of leverage constraints and other
requirements can be viewed as a laudable (if ill-fated) attempt
to influence the direction of international reforms designed
G20 Seoul Summit Leaders Declaration, 11-12 November
2010 ("G20 Communiqub"), available at http://www.g20.
org/pub communiques.aspx (accessed on 26 January 2011).
2 Ibid. 2. Other "shadow banks" include finance companies, asset-
backed commercial paper conduits, securities lenders and, in
the US, government-sponsored entities: see Z Pozsar,T Adrian,
A Ashcraft and H Boesky, "Shadow Banking", Federal Reserve
Bank of NewYork Staff Reports No 458 (July 2010).
The AIFM Directive ("the Directive") was voted through
by the European Parliament on 11 November 2010. As of
26 January 2011, however, formal adoption had yet to be
announced. The acronym AIFM is used to denote legal or
natural persons whose regular business is to manage one or
more AIFs (Directive,Art 3(b)).
to mitigate systemic risks within the shadow banking sector.
In each of these respects, it may ultimately not have been that
EU policymakers had their heads in the sand so much as they
were attempting to draw a line in it.
So is the AIFM Directive a harbinger of things to come? Poten-
tially yes. The EU is already leading the charge to reform
corporate governance and remuneration practices within
financial institutions. 99 It also recently announced its inten-
tion to crack down on speculation within commodities
markets, which it views as having contributed to excessive
volatility in food prices.10 0 Both of these initiatives have what
might be characterised as a decidedly Continental flavour.
Like the AIFM Directive, neither of them have been met with
open arms outside the EU. If this emergent trend continues,
the fragile consensus reflected in the G20 Communiqub will
inevitability unravel. If it does, we will have failed to heed one
of the most important lessons of the GFC.
F. Conclusion
It is in many respects still too early to pass definitive judge-
ment on the AIFM Directive. The vast majority of its
substantive requirements remain to be fleshed out through
the articulation of level 2 implementing measures, technical
standards and guidelines. The ESMA would be well advised
to seek out and engage meaningfully with the alternative
investment fund industry as part of this process. More broadly,
it remains to be seen how the fledgling ESMA will grow
into its new role as pan-European securities regulator. Will
it soar on the wings of its substantial new powers? Or will it crash
back down to earth under the weight of its broad remit and anemic
resources? Despite this lingering uncertainty, it is possible to
make two important, if cautious, observations. First, the real
world benefits flowing from the adoption of the Directive
are - at best - unclear. Many of its requirements will probably
mirror existing national regulatory regimes and/or prevailing
market practices. Others, meanwhile, and in particular those
aimed at ameliorating potential systemic risks, are simply not
fit for purpose. Second, the adoption of the Directive was
likely motivated as much by politics as by policy. In the end,
neither observation generates much cause for optimism. *
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